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September 14, 1988, Mr. Shupe was arrested for solicitation.

The

solicitation occurred during his lunch hour# when he was off
company property and not on the properties of any businesses
which he serviced as a repairman.

He eventually pled guilty to a

third-degree misdemeanor, and was fined $100.00.
When he received his notice to appear to enter his plea, he
got permission to take time off work and to go to court on the
appropriate day.

When asked about why he needed to go to court,

the claimant, fearing reprisal, did not tell his employer the
real reason for his court appearance and instead said that he had
to appear in court as a witness.

When he got to the court, he

was informed that the date scheduled for his plea was incorrect,
that the court was not in session that day, and that he would
have to reschedule his court date.
As of September 26, 1988, Claimant had not rescheduled his
court date.

Nor had he received the usual court warning in the

mail that failure to reschedule would result in his arrest.

On

that day, a warrant was issued for his arrest and he was arrested
on company property when he arrived for work.
After his release later that day, Claimant called work and
told his employer why he was arrested.
discharged.

He was immediately

Two days later, he received in the mail his initial

warning from the court to reschedule his appearance or be subject
to arrest.
The Utah Department of Employment Security denied Claimant
unemployment compensation benefits on October 28, 1988. The
2

denial was affirmed by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on
November 29, 1988, after a hearing on November 21, 1988. The ALJ
found relevant an incident over thirteen months earlier, in
October 1987, when Claimant had purportedly made sexuallyoriented comments to a fourteen year-old boy on company property,
and had been put on probation following the incident.

The ALJ

held that there was just cause for discharge because the actions
of Claimant "shrouded the employer's ability to trust him
(Claimant) to behave in a socially-acceptable manner.11 On
February 7, 1989 the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
affirmed on the same grounds.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the application of statutes or regulations to
the pertinent facts, this Court should apply an intermediate
standard of review, which is a determination of whether the
conclusions are reasonable and rational. Steaen v. Department of
Employment Security, 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. of Appeals
1988). In determining which legal standard should be applied, the
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of
Review are entitled no deference.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission used the incorrect legal standard in
determining whether appellant John Shupe's actions constituted
3

disqualifying conduct for purposes of unemployment compensation
benefits. However, even under the standard they used, that of
just cause discharge, their conclusion that the conduct was
disqualifying is not a reasonable and rational conclusion based
on the pertinent facts because the appellant's actions were
insufficiently "connected" to his employment and insufficiently
indicative of fault on his part.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SHOULD HAVE APPLIED
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-4-5(b)(2) INSTEAD OF UTAH CODE
ANN. §35-4-5(b)(t)« UNDER THE FORMER CLAIMANT
IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS.
Prior to 1983, Utah Code Ann. 35-4-5(b)(1) denied
unemployment benefits to a claimant who was "discharged for an
act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a
crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the
employerfs rightful interest..."

The Utah Supreme Court in

Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security. 663 P.2d
440 (Utah 1983) articulated a three-pronged test for determining
"misconduct" and ineligibility for unemployment compensation. A
claimant was held to be disqualified for purposes of unemployment
compensation benefits

(1) when he was discharged for an act or

omission in connection with the employment (2) which was
"deliberate, willful, or wanton," and was (3) "adverse to the
employer's rightful interests."

In that case the court also held

that disqualifying actions need not be motivated by an intention
to cause harm to the employer or an intentional disregard of his
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interests, but could be "volitional acts by an employee who could
not have been heedless of their consequences." Id. at 444.
Also in 1983, after the court had heard arguments, but
before it had issued a decision, the Utah Legislature added a
"just cause" provision to Section 35-4-5(b)(1), thereby denying
eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits to any person:
For the week in which the claimant was
discharged for just cause or for an act or
omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the
employerfs rightful interest, if so found by
the commission, and thereafter until claimant
has earned an amount equal to at least six
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in
bona fide covered employment. (Emphasis
added)
The case of Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial
Commission. 700 P.2d 1129 (1985) was the first to address the new
"just cause" provision.

The Kehl court determined that in order

to find just cause, there still must be a finding of fault on the
part of the claimant. The basic factors the court relied upon to
establish "fault" and ineligibility for benefits under the
definition of just cause were: (a) culpability, (b) knowledge,
and (c) control.
In Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission. 727
P.2d 206 (Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court held that the
standards for "just cause" and "deliberate, willful or wanton
misconduct" were identical since the court in Clearfield had
already determined that the latter did not require intentional

5

harm to the employer's interests. Id. at 210. They interpreted
the addition of "just cause" as designed to do exactly what the
decision in Clearfield did: eliminate the requirement of
intentional harm. See also Utah Administrative Code
§R475-5fe-l II. 3.

Since some fault on the part of the claimant

was still required, the Industrial Commission had promulgated
rules pertaining to culpability, knowledge, and control.
The plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) requires
that for acts constituting crimes, it is not the proper to apply
this particular section to determine disqualifying conduct. The
statute explicitly limits its application to "an act or
omission...not constituting a crime." Utah Code Ann. §35-45(b)(2) deals with discharges for criminal acts. It might be
argued that "just cause" is a separate standard and that the
limitation to non-criminal acts applies only to deliberate,
wanton or willful misconduct. Not only does Lane rule out this
interpretation, the courtfs decision there implied that the
legislature was not attempting to modify the portion of 35-45(b)(1) limiting that section to crimes. Even the dissent in
Lane, which claimed that there were two separate standards, was
based on the reasoning that while "deliberate, wanton or willful
misconduct" describes "conduct which falls short of being
intentional but which is more culpable than negligence...* just
cause1 for termination...might arise from the commission of a
negligent act." Id. at 212. Finally, Utah Administrative Code
§R475-5b-2 V. 1. and 2. state that discharge for crime should be
6

determined under 5(b)(1) only where it is disputed whether a
crime was committed.
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(2) requires not only a connection
to work# but that the crime be one of dishonesty. It will be
argued later that the actions of the claimant were not
sufficiently connected to work to constitute disqualifying
conduct, but it is clear that the claimant's crime was not one of
dishonesty. John Shupe pled guilty to a third-degree misdemeanor
for solicitation, and paid a $100.00 fine. Utah Code Ann. §76-101302 defines solicitation as agreeing to engage in sex for a fee
or loitering in front of a public building for that purpose. The
Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules state that "dishonesty in this
context generally means theft but may also include other criminal
acts connected with the work that render an employee
untrustworthy or show a lack of integrity." Utah Administrative
Code §R475-5b-2 III. There is nothing in whatever act
constituted the claimant's act of solicitation that indicates any
lack of trustworthiness or lack of integrity. Since the
Industrial Commission applied the wrong legal standard, and under
the correct standard the claimant is entitled to benefits, the
decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed.
POINT II. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT WAS INSUFFICIENTLY
CONNECTED TO EMPLOYMENT TO WARRANT DENIAL OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS.
The Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules state that
disqualifying conduct must "have such xconnection' to the
employee's duties and to the employer's business that it is a
7

subject of legitimate and significant concern to the employer.tf
Utah Administrative Code, §475-5b-l VIII. (emphasis added). Thus,
in order for there to be a sufficient connection between the
actions of the claimant and his employment (1) the concerns of
the employer must be legitimate, (2) there must be a significant
potential hinderance if the employee's ability to perform his
duties, and (3) there must be significant potential harm to the
employer's interests.
John Shupe was a copy-machine repairman.

He was convicted

of a misdemeanor and lied to his employer about why he had to go
to court. Due mainly to bureaucratic error he was arrested on
company property for not appearing in court to enter his plea.
What John Shupe was punished for in a court of law and by
his employers through losing his job should not be the basis for
denial of unemployment benefits unless his conduct was
sufficiently connected to his employment. The incident involving
the 14 year-old boy took place on company property and during
work hours.

It was sufficiently connected to his employment to

be disqualifying conduct if other requirements were met. And the
employer did take corrective action and set forth guidelines for
the claimant to follow which he successfully completed.

His

ninety-day probation ended nine months prior to discharge.
Most of the conduct of the claimant that is relevant to this
case took place away from the workplace and not during work
hours. And while the claimant might have lied about why he had to
appear in court because of embarrassment or fear of reprisal by
8

his employer, the magnitude of his lie (as compared with what
potentially he had to lose by telling the truth) is minimal, and
not necessarily reflective of his general trustworthiness as an
employee.

The claimant's reason for missing work was that he had

to appear in court, and he informed his employer about this fact
truthfully. Mr. Shupefs white lie about being a witness, rather
than the defendant, was hardly advisable but does not warrant the
generality that he is "untrustworthy" and therefore incapable of
successfully completing his professional duties. But the
supervisor who discharged the claimant, James Olson, testified
that he fired him because of the lie about the court appearance,
that the claimant could no longer be trusted with the tools the
company left in his care (TR. 7).
This case is distinguishable from Clearfield City v. Dept.
of Employment Security. 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The claimant's
actions in that case were much more egregious; he committed an
act of sodomy with one of his students at his secondary job at
the Clearfield Job Corps Center, while being observed by other
students. Id. at 441. It was widely publicized. And the claimant
there was also a police officer. The incident significantly
affected the his ability to perform his duties. As the court in
Clearfield noted, since "the entire course of events was a matter
of public notoriety in the city...(there) would surely have
(been) a significant adverse effect upon the officer's
credibility as a police officer and as a witness in the courts of
law." Id. at 443. In the case at bar not only was there no
9

publicity which might have affected the claimants ability to
perform his duties, his duties were not of the sort which would
likely be damaged by such publicity. As in Clearfield, the
claimant also told a lie to his supervisor, but the extent of the
lie was merely why he had to appear in court. Given the
embarrassing nature of the situation, and its irrelevance to his
work, this lie is hardly the sort of event that would be expected
to be repeated.
The court in Clearfield also noted that the claimant there
was breaking a law that he had an affirmative public duty to
uphold. Mr. Shupe's profession added no such additional duties to
be of extremely high moral character. The Administrative Law
Judge held that employers are warranted in expecting that
employees behave away from work "in a socially acceptable manner"
(ALJ's decision, p. 2). This is too broad; it makes almost any
conduct connected to employment. The employer does have an
interest in preventing dishonor to the company's name and
preserving the company's reputation is a legitimate concern. In
the case at bar the claimant was not on company property, not at
any business serviced by the company, not arrested while working,
not arrested for a significant crime, and received no publicity,
nor was he likely to receive publicity for the arrest. The
proposition that there was significant potential harm to the
employer's interests or that the claimant's ability to perform
his job was affected in any way are not supported by substantial
evidence.
10

The ALJ also suggested that the claimant broke a reasonable
rule of the employer, wthat any similar behavior (to the incident
in October 1987) would result in dismissal" (ALJ's decision, page
2). But the first incident occurred on company property and
during work hours. The employer presented little evidence
regarding either incident, but there are obvious dissimilarities.
The only similarity is that the both involved sex, and this
connection itself depends on Scott Olson's hearsay within hearsay
testimony regarding the first incident (TR. 9). There is not even
the suggestion that the second event was "socially unacceptable"
in a similar way. There was no suggestion that the behavior
involved homosexual conduct or a minor. Its unacceptability
consisted mostly in its illegality, which may just have been a
matter of loitering in the wrong place at the wrong time. See
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1302 (1973). The employer's warning to the
claimant in October 1987 was too ambiguous to constitute a rule
and a reasonable interpretation of it would hardly apply to the
actions for which the claimant was arrested for in connection to
the solicitation charge. It is not a legitimate concern of the
employer that employees behave in a "socially acceptable" manner
when off company property and during non-working hours. The Utah
Administrative Code reflect this; they require at least potential
significant damage to the reputation of the business. Id. at
§R475-5b-l VII. Since this is not a legitimate concern, and what
concerns the employer had were insignificantly related to either
the claimant's ability to perform his duties or other potential
11

harm to the employer's interests, the decision of the Industrial
Commission that the claimant's conduct was sufficiently connected
to his employment to warrant denial of benefits should be
reversed.
POINT III. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT CONSTITUTE JUST
CAUSE FOR DISCHARGE SINCE IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
CULPABLE NOR COULD HE HAVE REASONABLY
ANTICIPATED THE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE.
The Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules list three
requirements for a determination of eligibility under its
definition of just causes
control.

(a) culpability (b) knowledge, and (c)

Since the question of control is not at issue in the

Shupe case, only the culpability and knowledge factors will be
analyzed in this memorandum. These are the three factors that the
court in Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, supra,
stated were the proper elements to consider in determining fault
on the part of the claimant.
A. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CULPABLE.
The Kehl court defined culpability as the seriousness of the
conduct as it affects continuance of the employment relationship.
The discharge "must have been necessary to avoid actual or
potential harm to the employer•s rightful interests... The
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the context of the
particular employment and how it affects the employer's rights.
If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and
there is no expectation that the conduct will be continued or
repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is not

12

necessary to discharge the employee."

Utah Administrative Code

§R475-5b-l II. 1. a.
The court in Kehl held that the wrongness of claimant's
conduct (carrying ten thousand ponds of explosives over a train
track while a train was approaching), if viewed in the context of
the employment and the potentially devastating effects on the
employer's rights, was severe.

Discharge in Kehl was necessary

to avoid the potential harm to the employer's interests that
another violation would cause.
Applying the "culpability" standard to the Shupe case, it
should be reasonably concluded that Shupe's conduct doesn't reach
the standard of culpability set forth in Kehl.
was not a work-related or during-work act.

Shupe's conduct

Whereas Kehl's act of

carrying explosives over the train tracks in the wake of an
approaching train shows a reckless disregard for the company
rules and an imminent danger to human lives, the claimant's
conduct only concerned himself.

Kehl's act could have cost her

employer, Hercules, several hundreds of thousands of dollars, as
well as cost Hercules its excellent reputation in the community.
Shupe's conduct cost his employer nothing.

His conduct does not

show a disregard for the company rules, nor does his conduct
relate to his work at all.

Company rules cannot reasonably

regulate an employee's life during non-work hours, unless the
regulation is regarding conduct which would prevent the employee
from performing his/her job satisfactorily or could cause
significant damage for the employee.
13

Whether Shupe solicited sex

or not during his non-work hours has no bearing on whether he can
perform his duties as a copy repairman to the satisfaction of his
employer. And it is hard to see how his actions could subject the
employer to any sort of legal liability.
Finally, there is no evidence that Shupe's conduct caused
any negative publicity for the employer —

in fact, there is no

evidence that the incident was publicized at all.

Shupe's

conduct can be distinguished from the conduct in the Kehl case,
where a potential accident would definitely have received adverse
publicity for Hercules, and might have caused a public outcry
against the company for its lack of compliance with public safety
concerns.
Shupefs conduct can also be distinguished from the conduct
in Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663 P.2d
440 (Utah 1983), where a policeman who also worked part time as a
counselor committed sodomy on the job site where he was a
counselor.

In the Clearfield case, the sodomy incident was

widely publicized in the community. Said the Clearfield Court,
11

In the sensitive area of law enforcement a police officer's

reputation of high moral character and his credibility as a
witness in his frequent appearances in the court of law are
essential to his effective performance of his duty...Under the
circumstances, the claimantfs actions were sufficiently culpable
and adverse to the employer's rightful interest to invoke
disqualification under Section 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Utah
Employment Security Act."

See Clearfield, 663 P.2d at 442.
14

Unlike the law enforcement area, Shupe's job as a copymachine repairman did not require high moral character. Nor did
Shupe's immoral conduct threaten to bring his company into
disrepute.

Without substantiated evidence of adverse publicity

to the Les Olson Company proximately caused by Shupe's arrest,
Shupe's conduct cannot be considered

"culpable11 and adverse to

his employerfs interests under 35-4-5(b)(1).
B. IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO EXPECT THE CLAIMANT TO ANTICIPATE
THE EFFECTS OF HIS CONDUCT.
In Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 727
P.2d 206 (Utah 1986), a truck stop employee was discharged from
his employment when he was cited by policemen for selling beer to
a minor.

His employer company refused to pay him unemployment

benefits.

The court, in determining whether the employee had

been discharged with just cause, looked at whether the employee
M

had knowledge" of the company policy not to sell beer to minors.
The court held that while the employee did have knowledge of

the prohibition of liquor sales to minors, nonetheless his error
in not checking the customer's identification was merely a
mistake in judgment and not an intentional or knowing disregard
of his employer's policy.

Said the court, "there is nothing in

the record to indicate that Telum (the employer) established any
clear procedures for employees to follow to assure that beer
would not be sold to minors, other than to instruct them to check
identification when in doubt."

Lane, 727 P.2d at 211.

15

Likewise, in the Kehl case, the Court held that in order for
an employee to have sufficient knowledge of the conduct expected
of him by his employer, the employer must have given either a
clear explanation of the expected behavior or have a pertinent
written policy regarding that conduct.

"If the employerfs

expectations are unclear, ambiguous, or inconsistent, the
existence of knowledge is not shown."

Kehl. 700 P.2d at 1133.

In the case at bar, there was no clear written policy on
employer's expectations of employees1 behavior while not at work.
Although Shupe was warned by his employer in 1987 that sexual
solicitation of a minor on the job would not be acceptable to the
company, there was no explanation given that any kind of
solicitation whatsoever, whether on company property or not,
whether during work hours or not, or whether to a minor or not,
would be reprehensible to the company.

With no company

regulations and no verbal explanations of his expected conduct
off-duty and during non-work hours, Shupe could not be expected
to know that his non-work-related conduct was violative of
company policy.

He can only be held to have knowledge of what

his employer's expectations of his conduct on the job were.
The Lane court held that the truck stop employee's omission
of a check on a minor's identification was an isolated instance
of poor judgment.

Likewise, Shupe's off-site sexual solicitation

is an isolated instance of poor judgment in a situation where he
had no knowledge of company policy, indeed, a situation where
company policy did not exist.

Therefore, Shupe should not be
16

held to have the requisite knowledge which constitutes just
cause.
CONCLUSION
Under Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1), Claimant John Shupe was
not discharged with just cause. His actions were not
sufficiently connected with his employment to constitute just
cause for discharge.

His discharge was not necessary to avoid

actual or potential harm to his employer's rightful interests,
nor did he have the sufficient culpability or knowledge to
constitute "fault,11 a necessary requisite to establishing just
cause. The Industrial Commission should have applied Utah Code
Ann. §35-4-5(b)(2), but the claimant's conduct did not constitute
disqualifying conduct under this statute either. For these
reasons we respectfully request that this court reverse the
decisions of the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission, and order the Industrial Commission
to award unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant, John
Shupe•
DATED this f^f

day of

, 1989.

Q^N5£

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Claimant

By:
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I do hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: Winston M. Faux,
Attorney for Respondent, Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 1234 South
Main Street, P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 on this
I^T
day of ^XjLh*£z
, 1989, postage prepaid.
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35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits.
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found
by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in
bona fide covered employment and earned wages
for those services equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the
claimant leaves work under circumstances of
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the
employer, consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity
and good conscience.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to
or in a new locality does so without good cause
for purposes of this subsection.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act or
omission in connection with employment,
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least
six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount in bona fide covered employment.
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime
in connection with his work as shown -by the
facts together with his admission, or as
shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of a crime in connection
with that dishonesty and for the 51 next following weeks. If by reason of his alleged dishonesty in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal custody or is free on
bail, any determination of his eligibility
shall be held in abeyance pending his release
or conviction^

ADDENDUM

1-1

5-5b. Discharge and Discharge for
ae

j

5b-1 Discharge
5b-2 Discharge for Crime

•5b-1. Discharge
icnerai Definition
linanlv accepted concepts of justice are used in
nining if a discharge is disqualifying under the
cause* provisions of the Act Just cause is
d as a job separation that is necessary due to
enousness of actual or potential harm to the
>ver provided the claimant had knowledge of
nplover s expectations and had control over the
nstances which led to the discharge Just cause
t estabhshed if the reason for the discharge is
ss, arbitrary or capricious or the employer has
to uniformly apply reasonable standards to all
vees when instituting disciplinary action The
se of this section is to deny benefits to mdiviwho bnng about their own unemployment by
cting themselves, with respect to their emplowith callousness, misbehavior, or lack of
leration to such a degree that the employer was
ed in discharging the employee However, when
uployee is discharged by his employer, such
irge may have been the result of incompetence,
Df skill, or other reasons which are beyond the
mt's control The question which must be ested by the evidence is whether the claimant is at
in his resulting unemployment Unemployment
nee benefits will be denied if the employer had
:ause for discharging the employee However,
very cause for discharge provides a basis to
benefits In order to have just cause for dischpursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must
ne fault on the pan of the employee involved
fust Cause
rhe basic factors which establish just cause, and
»entia! for a determination of ineligibility arc
"ulpabihty
s is the seriousness of the conduct or the seve>f the offense as it affects continuance of the
jyment relationship. The discharge must have
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to
mployer's rightful interests A discharge would
)e considered "necessary" if it is not consistent
reasonable employment practices. The wi-ong*
of the conduct must be considered in the context
le particular employment and how it affects the
oyer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated
ent of poor judgment and there is no expectathat the conduct will be continued or repeated,
mal harm may not be shown and therefore it i$
ecessary to discharge the employee
Longevity and prior work record are important
etermimng if the act or omission is an isolated
ent or a good faith error m judgment. An
oyee who has historically complied with work
does not demonstrate by a single violation, even
gh harmful, that such violations will be repeated
therefore require discharge to avoid future harm
le employer For example. A long term employee
does not have a history of tardiness or absentn is absent without leave for a number of days
to a death in his immediate family. Although
is a violation of the employer's rules and may
bhsh just cause for discharging a new employee,
fact that the employee has established over a long
od of time that he complies with attendance rules
vs that the circumstance is more of an isolated
jent rather than a violation of the rules that is or
Id be expected to be habitual In this case because
potential for harm to the employer is not shown,
> not necessary for the employer to discharge the
)loyee, and therefore just cause is not established

J
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b Knowledge
The employee must have had a knowledge of the
conduct which the employer expected. It is not nee
essary that the claimant intended to cause harm to
the employer, but he should reasonably have been
able to anticipate the effect his conduct *ould have
Knowledge may not be estabhshed unless the empioyer gave a clear explanation of the expected bchavior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the
case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of
behavior If the employer's expectations are unclear,
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown A specific warning is one way of
showing that the employee had knowledge of the
expected conduct After the employee is given i
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct
objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring after the warning would be necessary to establish
just cause for a discharge
(1) For Example When the employer has an established procedure of progressive discipline, such
procedures generally must have been followed m
order to establish that the employee had knowledge
of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the
act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such
as criminal actions, may justify immediate discharge
without following a progressive disciplinary program

3. The term "just cause" as used in Section 5(b)(1)
does not lessen the requirement that there be some
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to
the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an intentional infliction of harm or intentional disregard of
the employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature in adding the words "just cause" to Section
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive interpretation. While some fault must be present, it is
sufficient that the acts were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts
have serious effect on the employee's job or the
employer's interests.

VII In Connection with Employment
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses
which take place on the employer's premises or
during business hours. It is only necessary that the
conduct have such "connection* to the employee's
duties and to the employer's business that it is a
subject of legitimate and significant concern to the
employer. All employers, both public and private
have the right to expect employees to refrain from
acts which are detrimental to the business or would
bnng dishonor on the business name or the institution. Legitimate interests of employers mclude, but
are not limited to* goodwill of customers, reputation
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty.
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Cnme
I General Definition
1 A cnme is a punishable act in violation of law,
an offense against the State or the United States
"Cnme" and "Misdemeanor" are synonymous terms;
though in common usage cnme is used to denote
offenses of a more senous nature. However, for
example- an insignificant, although illegal act, or the
taking of something which is of little or no value, or
believed to have been abandoned may not be suffcicnt to establish that a cnme was committed as
defined for the application of this section of the Act,
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation
of the law
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2. The duty of honesty is implied in any empio^
mem relationship A worker is obligated to deal wit
his employer in truthfulness and good faith A
individual discharged for dishonesty constituting
cnme connected with his work is at fault in his rec
ulting unemployment The 52 week disquaiificatio
for "dishonesty constituting a cnme* required by tt
statute is a mandatory penalty
3 The basic factors which are essential for a dis
qualification under this provision of the law are tha
the individual was discharged for a crime that was
a. In connection with work
b Dishonesty
c. Admitted or established by a conviction m
coun of law

III Dishonesty
Dishonesty tn this context generally means tht
but may also include other criminal acts connect
wtth the work that render the employee untrust*
nhy or show a lack of integrity Dishonesty n
involving a crime may still be disqualifying unc
provisions of Section 5(b)(1)
IV Admission or Conviction in a Court
1 An admission is a voluntary acknowledges
made by a claimant that he has committed acts which
are in violation of the law In this context, the
admission may be a verbal or wntten statement by
the claimant that he committed the act The admission does not necessarily have to be made to a Department representative However, there must be sufficient information to establish that it was noc a false
statement given under duress or made to obtain some
concession.
2. A conviction is when a claimant has been found
guilty by a court of committing acts which are in
violation of the law When the claimant pleads "no
contest" or agrees to the diversionary program as
provided by the court, this is treated, for the purposes of this section of the Act, the same as a conviction and benefits will be denied.
V Benefits Held in Abeyance
1 If the claimant has not made an admission, but
is held in legal custody or free on bail, the law requires a withholding of a determination of eligibility
Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of
eligibility is made Failure to pay benefits even
though the burden of proof for a denial under
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because
the court, in holding the claimant in legal custody or
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that
the state has established that a cnme has been conmitted and there is reason to believe the individual
committed that cnme. The filing of charges is not the
same as being held in custody
2. However, if there is a preponderance of evid
ence that the act was committed, a denial of benefits
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if
charges have not been filed by the employer within
four weeks In such a case, the decision under
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a
decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is still pending
and the 5(b)(1) disqualification shall be changed to a
5(b)(2) disqualification if the claimant is found guilty
by the court If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1)
disqualification which was or could be assessed
pending a ruling by the coun, benefits must be held
in abeyance until the court reaches the verdia The
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Department with the court's verdia in order to establish
eligibility

76-10-1302. Prostitution.
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when:
(a) He engages or offers or agrees to engage in
any sexual activity with another person for a fee;
or
(b) Is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or
(c) Loiters in or within view of any public
place for the purpose of being hired to engage in
sexual activity.
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor, provided
that any person who is twice convicted under this
section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1973
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
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